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Abstract 
We1 examine the marginal effects of decentralized public health spending by 
incorporating estimates of behavioural responses to changes in public health 
spending through benefit incidence analysis. The analysis is based on a panel 
dataset of 207 Indonesian districts over a 4-year period from 2001 to 2004. We 
show that district-level public health spending is largely driven by central 
government transfers, with an elasticity of public health spending with respect 
to district revenues of around 0.9. We find a positive effect of public health 
spending on utilization of outpatient care in the public sector for the poorest 
two quartiles. We find no evidence that public expenditures crowd out 
utilization of private services or household health spending. Our analysis 
suggests that increased public health spending improves targeting to the poor, 
as behavioural changes in public health care utilization are pro-poor. 
Nonetheless, most of the benefits of the additional spending accrued to 
existing users of services, as initial utilization shares outweigh the behavioural 
responses. 
JEL: H72, H75, I18 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years most developing countries have introduced decentralization policies, 
which to varying degrees delegate the provision of local services (including key health 
services) to sub-national governments. Given the significance of this trend and of the new 
responsibilities vested in local administrations, it is particularly important to understand 
how sub-national government revenues –and their composition- translate into health 
spending and this in turn translates into benefits for their populations. 
There is a rich literature on the effectiveness of public health spending (World 
Bank 2004). Based on cross country variation Filmer and Pritchett (1999) note the lack of 
correlation between public health spending and child mortality and conclude that 
governance, or the way in which resources translate into actual programs, and crowding 
out of the private sector by the public sector are the missing chains that explain the low 
correlation.  
Supporting empirical evidence for the first – governance matters – claim is 
provided by Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008), who show that more public health spending 
reduces child mortality in good governance countries. Making a similar argument, 
McGuire (2006) shows that in a cross section of developing countries, access to maternal 
and infant health programs is correlated with decreased under-five mortality, while public 
health spending is not. This indicates that it is the quality of the implemented programs 
that matter, and not the spending per se. The effects of public health spending may also 
vary by population segment. Using cross-country data, Gupta et al. (2003) show that 
higher public health spending reduces child mortality among the poorest quintile, while 
no effects can be detected among the rich. 
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Supporting evidence for the second - public sector crowds out the private sector - 
claim comes from several authors, who note that total health spending is closely 
correlated with GDP, with an elasticity around one (Gerdtham & Jönsson 2000; van der 
Gaag & Štimac 2008). The share of public spending devoted to health however varies a 
lot across governments, suggesting that the size of the private sector adjusts to the size of 
the public sector. 
However, conclusions regarding the determinants and effectiveness of public 
health spending based on cross-country analysis should be interpreted with caution. 
Omitted variable bias, resulting from country specific unobserved historic and 
institutional factors that influence both public spending decisions and health outcomes, 
make it difficult to interpret the estimated relationships as causal. Moreover, cross-
country studies are typically prone to measurement error, due to inconsistencies between 
countries in data quality, data collection tools, and underlying sources of (micro) data. 
Perhaps the most serious problem is that public health spending is endogenously 
determined by a fiscal and public health policy that could be influenced by the outcome 
variables of interest.  
Analyzing sub-national expenditures in a decentralized context overcomes many 
of the problems associated with cross country analysis. As sub-national governments 
operate within the same institutional setting and often share data collection tools, the 
analyses are less plagued by omitted variable biases. Bhalotra (2007) analyzes the effects 
of state health expenditures in India on child mortality using a 29-year panel of 15 states. 
She finds generally small effects, with a negative significant effect appearing in the third 
 3 
lag of public health expenditures for rural areas. Nevertheless, Bhalotra (2007) does not 
control for endogeneity of state government revenues and thus state spending. 
Another strand of literature looks at benefit incidence analysis and is widely used 
in policy circles to analyze the benefits of public health spending (Shah 2005, page 21-
22). Benefit incidence analysis focuses not so much on the impact of public spending but 
rather on who the beneficiaries of public spending are. Since many benefits are derived 
by obtaining services from public providers, a standard procedure is to assume that 
benefits are proportional to utilization rates. The share of total benefits received by the 
poor is then directly deduced from their observed use of public services. Several authors 
have noted that this average benefit incidence may not be a good predictor of who would 
benefit from changes in public spending. For example, Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) 
argue that the distributional effects of public spending reforms may differ from static 
average patterns due to political processes that drive such reforms, while van de Walle 
(1995) notes the importance of considering behavioural responses in benefit incidence 
analysis. Changes in utilization rates resulting from public spending need to be taken into 
account. Younger (2003) notes that a lot of progress can be made by looking in more 
detail at the specific categories of spending in which changes would take place. For 
instance, additional spending to finance an expansion of services will impact different 
groups than a similar increase channelled toward a general quality upgrade, which will 
largely benefit existing users. 
This paper seeks to contribute to these different strands of literature. First, we 
analyze sub-national public health care spending, its determinants, and impacts, in 207 
Indonesian districts. We look at mechanisms through which changes in local government 
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resources affect district level public spending on health. The analysis covers the period 
from 2001 to 2004, immediately after Indonesia’s push to decentralize, and district 
governments received far reaching authority to determine the size and composition of 
their spending. This period just after decentralization, when budgets were still in flux, 
provides a unique opportunity to analyze the determinants and impacts of public health 
spending, across governments that inherited a similar institutional setting. 
The second contribution of this paper is the development of a method to analyze 
the marginal benefit incidence of public health spending that takes account of behavioural 
responses to changes in public spending, thus avoiding the arbitrary assumptions used in 
earlier studies. By linking the fiscal data to district income-specific utilization rates of 
public services obtained from household surveys, we can estimate the elasticity of 
demand for public services with respect to changes in public spending. We show that 
marginal benefit incidence can be calculated by multiplying average benefit incidence 
rates with a simple correction factor based on these elasticities. 
The third contribution is that we explicitly test whether changes in public 
spending crowd out private spending in the health sector. We do so by estimating the 
cross elasticity of utilization of services in the private sector with respect to changes in 
public spending directed to the public sector. We also test whether changes in public 
health spending crowd out out-of-pocket (OOP) health expenditures by households. 
We find that public health spending is elastic with respect to district revenues, 
which is mainly driven by untied transfers from the central government and district own 
revenues. Public health spending has a positive effect on utilization of outpatient care in 
the public sector for the poorest two quartiles. Increased public health spending improves 
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targeting to the poor, as behavioural changes in public health care utilization tend to be 
pro-poor. But these behavioural changes are relatively small compared to initial 
utilization shares. Hence, most of the benefits of the additional spending accrue to 
existing users of services. We find no impact of changes in public health spending on 
utilization of health services from the private sector or on OOP health expenditures, thus 
casting doubt on the earlier claims that the public sector crowds out the private sector in 
health. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of 
decentralization in the health sector in Indonesia. We describe the sources of revenues of 
districts, and the trends in central and district government expenditures over the period of 
study. Section 3 analyzes the determinants of public health spending by districts. Section 
4 presents a behavioural benefit incidence analysis of changes in district health spending, 
evaluates the impact of public spending and provides a sensitivity analysis. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Setting and Data 
Indonesia’s health sector is highly decentralized. Bossert (1998) developed a 
classification method to characterize the extent of centralization in the health sector. 
Table 1 shows where Indonesia stands in this classification. Districts have the legal 
responsibility to provide basic health care. They are free to set user fees for public health 
services (to be used as a revenue stream for local government operations) and there are 
no rules or guidelines for allocating resources and carrying out particular programs. 
Districts are not required to justify local spending to the central government based on 
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outputs or pre-defined objectives. Instead, district governments are accountable to district 
parliaments. Indonesia’s health care system also retains important centralist features. The 
central government sets employment conditions for civil servants, including those 
working in public health service providers financed by district governments. It also 
finances and runs social safety net programs for the poor, such as targeted price subsidies 
for public care. Total health spending is split almost evenly between the 
central/provincial level on one hand and the district level on the other hand; in 2005, they 
accounted for 48 percent and 52 percent of public health expenditures respectively 
(World Bank 2008). 
In spite of their high share of expenditures, districts remain highly dependent on 
the central government for their revenues, 90 percent of which they receive as transfers 
from the center (World Bank 2008). The largest transfer, 56 percent of total district 
revenues, is the general allocation grant (Dana Alokasi Umum – DAU), which is a 
formula-based untied grant (Hofman et al. 2006). The other main transfers are shared tax 
revenues - 11 percent of total revenues - and shared non-tax revenues - 12 percent of total 
revenues. The former consists largely of property and income taxes that are administered 
by the central government and transferred back to the districts. The shared non-tax 
revenue is largely a natural-resource revenue that is also distributed back to the districts 
(World Bank 2007). Finally, there is the specific allocation grant (Dana Alokasi Khusus – 
DAK), a tied resource whose use is determined centrally but which only accounts for a 
modest share of district revenues (3 percent in 2005). District own revenues are non-
negligible and have been increasing as a share of the total from 10 to 16 percent between 
2001 and 2004 (World Bank 2007), but they are unequally distributed. 
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Overall public resources for health increased considerably between 2001 and 
2004 (Table 2). Total health expenditures increased on average 23 percent on a year to 
year basis. For comparison, the average inflation rate equalled 9 percent over this period 
and total nominal public expenditures at all levels of government grew by 10 percent.1 
Indonesia is no anomaly in this respect; other countries that decentralized also increased 
spending in the public sector (Granado et al. 2005). Both local and central governments 
contributed to rising health expenditures. Therefore, the elasticities reported in this paper 
mostly reflect the impact of increases in public spending, which may differ from the ones 
resulting from downward adjustments (Lago-Penas 2008).  
The empirical analysis in this paper draws on two main data sources. The first is 
Indonesia’s national household survey, Susenas, fielded every year and representative at 
the district level. It contains information on household socio-economic characteristics, 
health services utilization, and private expenditures, including on health. The second 
source, compiled by the Ministry of Finance, contains detailed records of local 
government revenues and expenditures for the post-decentralization years; both routine 
and development expenditures can be broken down by sector, including health. Routine 
expenditures consist of salaries and operational costs of providing health services at 
public facilities. Development expenditures are investments, such as upgrading of health 
facilities and training. However, the data do not allow a facility level stratification. 
We combined the two data sources to construct a district level panel. Since the 
household survey data are collected around February, while the fiscal data reflect 
expenditures during the calendar year, the effects of changes in public spending are 
observed in the Susenas of the subsequent year. Therefore we constructed a panel that 
                                                 
1 Source: IMF 2009 World Economic Outlook and World Bank (2008), respectively. 
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contains district revenues and spending data of 2001 to 2004, linked with the Susenas 
data for 2002 to 2005. 
During the 4 years analyzed, new districts emerged as a result of district splits. In 
such cases, we aggregated the data from the split districts, and assigned those to the 
original district definition. We applied the 2000, pre-decentralization, district definition 
frame, which comprised 305 districts. Unfortunately some of these districts had to be 
dropped from the sample, for several reasons. First, the capital Jakarta comprises 6 
districts but is treated as one observation, since the budget data is consolidated for the 
larger metropolis. Second, over the period under investigation, Indonesia faced a number 
of local conflicts that made it unsafe for surveyors to collect information. Only those 
districts for which we have complete Susenas data are included in the analysis. Third, 
budget data is not available for all districts, and those with missing entries were therefore 
dropped from the analysis. Finally, two provinces, Aceh and Papua, are excluded since 
both have been granted a special autonomy status in 2001 and their budgets are not 
included in the dataset compiled by the Ministry of Finance. The balanced panel therefore 
contains data from 207 districts, which represent 70 percent of total public health 
spending by districts at the time of decentralization and include 40 districts that split after 
2001. 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the balanced panel of districts2, including 
(i) per capita district revenues by source, and health spending for budget years 2001 to 
                                                 
2 District revenue, public spending and OOP health payments are reflected in 2001 constant prices. Rupiah 
– USD exchange rate for 2001 is 10,246 (IMF article IV consultation 2004). 
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2004, and (ii) average district utilization rates and OOP health spending by households in 
the month prior to the survey in 2002 to 20053. 
Both district revenues and public health spending increased strongly during the 
first four years of decentralization in Indonesia. Total per capita district revenues 
increased from 415,987 Rupiah in 2001 to 563,934 Rupiah in 2005. The bulk of district 
income comes from DAU allocations, but its share decreased from 75 percent in 2001 to 
66 percent in 2004. This is mainly due to increases in shared non tax revenue and DAK 
allocations. Public health spending by districts also increased per capita, from 26,057 
Rupiah in 2001 to 41,959 Rupiah in 2004. This change is driven by development health 
spending, whose share increased from 22 to 42 percent. 
Average utilization of public outpatient care in districts increased from 0.073 out 
patient visits per person per month (vppm) in 2002 to 0.094 vppm in 2005, with a slight 
dip in 2004. This trend is in contrast to private health care utilization, which decreased 
slightly from 0.079 vppm in 2002 to 0.072 vppm in 2005. We observe somewhat similar 
patterns for the poorest quarter of the Indonesian population. District average for 
utilization of public health care by the poorest quartile increased from 0.074 vppm in 
2002 to 0.083 vppm in 2005, most of which occurred after 2003. Utilization of private 
care decreased from 0.053 vppm in 2002 to 0.046 vppm in 2005. This gradual move from 
private to – largely subsidised – public utilization is reflected in average per capita OOP 
health spending by the poorest, which decreased from 3,339 Rupiah per capita per month 
to 2,386 Rupiah in 2005. 
 
                                                 
3 Note that utilization and OOP spending do not reflect national averages, but the average of the district 
averages (i.e. the observations for our balanced panel). 
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3. Determinants of decentralized public health spending 
Public spending on health is closely correlated with overall levels of district government 
revenues (Figure 1). Comparing the pattern of 2004 with that of 2001, the slope is steeper 
and the fit of the curve improves, indicating that districts are converging towards a 
common spending pattern. This is also reflected in simple cross section regressions, as 
the gradient increases from 0.91 to 0.99 and the R-squared from 0.58 to 0.70. When we 
compare the changes in district ranking by revenue with changes in ranking by health 
spending, the Spearman rank correlation coefficient between district per capita revenue in 
2001 and 2004 is 0.706, while for district health spending it is 0.674, indicating that 
district revenue rank is more stable over time than spending rank. Although this cannot 
be interpreted as a causal effect, it does suggest that spending is adjusting to revenues, 
rather than the other way around. 
To investigate the causal relationship between local revenues and public health 
spending patterns, model (1) relates district per capita public health spending (Hit) to 
district per capita revenues (Rit), time variant district observable variables, time invariant 
district unobservable variables, a time trend and an error term: 
ittiit
r
ritritit XsRcH εδαφγβ ++++++= ∑
=
6
2
loglog  (1) 
where i denotes the district and t the year. Imposing this log-log specification, we 
interpret β as the elasticity of health spending with respect to revenues at the district level. 
We also investigate whether the source of revenue matters for health spending, by 
including the share of each main revenue source, srt in the regression, excluding the share 
of DAU funding. The case of perfect fungibility of district revenue sources would imply 
the testable hypothesis that γr = 0, for all revenue sources r. The set of control variables 
 11 
Xit includes demographic variables (average age, household size, and percentage of 
female population), the fraction of the population living in a rural area, and region fixed 
effects4. Time dummy variable, δt, picks up aggregate time shocks, while αi is modelled 
as a district fixed or random effect. For the fixed effect models, the region fixed effects 
are absorbed by the district fixed effects. Since the panel is based on the district definition 
of 1998, we also include a variable that tracks the number and timing of district splits. 
Our aim is to identify the causal effect of revenues on health spending. District 
unobservable factors, such as the number of civil servants employed at the time of 
decentralization, could influence both revenues and health spending and if ignored could 
lead to false inferences. By treating αi as a district fixed effect, we correct for such time 
invariant district specific omitted variables. 
Table 4 summarises the estimates of the elasticity of per capita district health 
expenditures with respect to per capita district revenue. Equation (1) is estimated first 
without the interaction terms, and separately for total public health spending, routine 
spending and development spending. A Hausman test rejects the random effects model in 
favour of the fixed effects model, although the elasticities are fairly robust to the choice 
of specification. The elasticity of total health spending with respect to revenue is slightly 
below one, at 0.88. Development spending is more sensitive to district revenue than 
routine spending: a one percent increase in revenue is associated with a 1.12 percent 
increase in development health spending, whereas routine expenditure increases by only 
0.83 percent. We conclude that the share of development health expenditures increases as 
districts have access to more resources. 
                                                 
4 We define 5 regions: (i) Java and Bali, (ii) Sumatra, (iii) Sulawesi, (iv) Kalimantan and (v) Other Islands. 
 12 
The fixed effects approach leaves a potential source of bias through endogeneity 
in changes in revenues and spending over time. But the scope for time variant 
confounding effects is small, as all major sources of district revenue are determined 
exogenously with respect to public health spending. The only revenue source that is 
potentially susceptible to endogeneity is own revenues, for example if increased public 
spending would be used to reduce user fees. We therefore estimated equation (1) 
excluding own revenues from total revenues, and find the results to be robust.5 
We examined the relationship between categories of expenditure and sources of 
revenue in Table 5, by including the share of revenue source srt in the specification. 
Economic theory predicts that, money being fungible (except for DAK revenues), the 
revenue sources should not affect expenditure allocation decisions. Even for earmarked 
grants, such as the DAK, an increase does not necessarily translate in an equal increase in 
the associated sector spending, as government can adjust the allocations to other budget 
lines (Dye & McGuire 1992).  
However, the results suggest that the source of funding does matter for public 
health spending. A higher share of own revenues increases routine spending on health. 
Possibly local governments feel that the long term commitments (hiring staff) associated 
with routine spending are more securely covered if there are own revenues. A one percent 
increase in the share of own revenues increases health spending by 2 percent. For 
development spending we find a positive effect of the share of DAK spending, which is 
not unexpected. In the period under investigation, the sectoral coverage of the DAK was 
limited to education, health, local infrastructure (roads and irrigation), and government 
                                                 
5 These results are not shown here, but are reported in a supplemental appendix, which is available upon 
request. 
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office buildings for newly created local governments (World Bank 2007, p 123). The 
results suggest that, indeed, these tied grants resulted in a net increase in health spending. 
Variation in public spending js driven mainly by DAU transfers and local tax 
revenues. We find higher public health spending in districts with relatively large DAU 
revenue vis-à-vis shared tax and non tax revenues. The negative effect of shared non tax 
revenue is interesting, as it suggests that differences in natural resource endowment do 
not lead to divergence in public health spending. This implies that central government 
can have considerable indirect influence on local health budgets, through its decentralized 
fiscal instruments. 
Districts splits tend to reduce public health spending. A district that splits into two 
districts over the period of investigation – and is treated as one observation throughout – 
has on average 6 percent lower public per capita health expenditures after the split. It is 
not possible to separately identify the effect of a split on routine and development 
spending, as both elasticities are not statistically significant. Considering the externalities 
associated with public health spending at the district level, the negative effect of a district 
split is not un-expected. When districts split, these benefits are not internalized anymore 
when taking district spending decisions. 
 
4. Marginal benefit incidence of decentralized public health spending 
4.1. Marginal benefit incidence analysis 
To analyze the marginal benefit incidence of public health spending we propose a method 
that takes account of changes in utilization rates that may result from changes in spending, 
and apply this in the Indonesian setting. Following standard practice we write the benefit 
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incidence of public health spending on outpatient care for quartile q as the unit cost times 
the utilization rate observed in the quartile.6 This setup is similar to traditional static 
benefit incidence analysis, except that we let the utilization rate be a function of public 
health spending: 
 ( ) ( )( )
( )( )XHHD
XHHD
HH
XHB oq
o
o
q ,,
)(
, =  (2) 
where 
oH is the per capita public health spending on outpatient care, which is a function 
of total public health spending H; D is the per capita outpatient care utilization of public 
services, which is a function of public health spending on outpatient care Ho and a set of 
other determinants of health care demand, X. In the standard set up, Ho/D reflects the unit 
cost (or average unit subsidy) of an out patient visit, and Bq is interpreted as the per capita 
subsidy for utilization of outpatient care allocated to quartile q.  
The marginal benefit incidence of public health spending for quartile q is then 
defined as: 
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or: 
 ( )[ ]θθ −+= qooqq hHdB ''  (3) 
where θ and θq denote the elasticity of outpatient care utilization with respect to public 
health spending for the full population and quartile q, respectively; and dq is the initial 
                                                 
6 See Demery (2003) for a general discussion of average benefit incidence analysis. 
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utilization share of quartile q, and ho is the share of the health budget devoted to 
outpatient care. 
Unfortunately, we do not have data on public spending on outpatient care 
provided in the public sector so we cannot estimate '
oH and ho. If public spending on 
outpatient care is a linear function of total health care spending, HH o α= , then (3) 
reduces to: 
 ( )θθα −+= qqq dB 1'  (4) 
If Ho would be observed directly then α drops out altogether. The marginal benefit 
incidence of quartile q thus depends on the initial share of the quartile q in total 
utilization, and the demand response of the quartile to public health spending, relative to 
the demand response of the entire population. 
This formula encompasses the two cases distinguished in Younger (2003) of a 
marginal benefit incidence of spending which only affects existing users (the average 
benefit incidence), and the marginal benefit incidence which is used entirely to finance an 
expansion of services. In the former, the demand response is assumed to be equal across 
the population, i.e. θq = θ, and the benefit incidence is entirely determined by existing 
differences in utilization rates between quartiles dq. In the latter, the unit cost remains 
constant, implying that θ = 1 and the benefits of additional public spending are absorbed 
by increases in demand. In that case the marginal benefit incidence equals: 
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which is the change in demand of quartile q relative to that of the entire group. This is 
what Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) estimate when they relate the average enrolment in a 
region to the income group specific enrolment using data from 62 regions in India’s 
national sample survey. Hence, to interpret the Lanjouw and Ravallion marginal benefit 
incidence results as marginal effects of public spending, one has to assume constant unit 
costs. 
 
4.2. Demand responses to district public health spending 
To calculate the marginal benefit incidence of decentralized public health spending for 
Indonesia we need estimates of the national and quartile specific elasticities of demand 
with respect to decentralized health spending. We model the utilization rate of public 
services as a log-linear function of one-year lagged per capita district health spending and 
a set of control variables: 
 ittiititdkitit XdHcu νδαληpi ++++++= −− 11)log(  (5) 
Where uit is the number of visit per person per month to a public provider. We present the 
effect on utilization both in levels and logarithms, where the latter is used for the 
marginal benefit incidence analysis. The control variables Xit are the same as in equation 
(1). We investigate the differential effect of development and routine spending, by 
including the lagged share of development spending in overall district health spending, 
dit-1. The equation above is also used to investigate crowding out effects, by estimating 
the impact of public health spending on the utilization of private services and on OOP 
health spending. 
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Again we need to consider possible endogeneity biases that may result from 
unobserved district specific effects, omitted variables related to local welfare and 
economic activity that drive tax revenues and health care demand, or even direct reverse 
causality if increased utilization of public care drives up district health budgets. Time 
invariant district effects that affect both health spending and utilization are controlled for 
by including district fixed effects. Dynamic effects, such as a sudden increase in 
utilization resulting in a sudden increase in health expenditures, are corrected to a large 
extent by using the previous year’s budget as the explanatory variable for this year’s 
utilization. Nevertheless, confounding time variant unobservables could still frustrate 
identification through serial correlation in vit. We therefore test for endogeneity using a 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, instrumenting Hit-1 with the shares of different revenues from 
central government (srt-1): DAU transfers, shared non tax revenue and DAK transfers. 
These seem suitable instruments as the previous section has shown these to be 
determinants of public health spending, while there is no reason to expect correlation of 
lagged revenue source shares with current health care utilization. The instruments provide 
sufficient support for identification as they are jointly significant at the 5 percent level 
and the validity of the exclusion restriction is supported by a Sargan test.7 Finally the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test results show no evidence of endogeneity of Hit-1 with respect to 
uit.
8 We therefore choose the fixed effects specification for the remainder of the analysis. 
We also estimated a random effects model, but Hausman tests rejected this in favour of 
                                                 
7 The Sargan Chi-squared test statistics vary between 0.061 to 2.406, with a critical value of 4.61 at 10 
percent level and 2 degrees of freedom. 
8 The results are not shown here, but are reported in a supplementary appendix, which is available upon 
request. 
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the fixed effects specification for the effect of public spending on public utilization and 
OOP health payments.9  
The results of the fixed effect regressions excluding and including the share of 
development spending (Table 6) suggest that public spending indeed affects the overall 
level of health care utilization. A one percent increase in district public health spending 
leads to an increase of 0.016 outpatient visits to a health care provider per person per 
month. This result is mainly due to the positive effect on public utilization, which 
increases by 0.011 vppm. The effect on private utilization is positive yet imprecise, but 
appears statistically significant when the share of development spending is included. This 
contradicts the crowding out hypothesis, which would imply a negative sign. The positive 
effect could be explained by the fact that many physicians in public health centres operate 
a private practice in parallel, often referring public care patients to their private practice. 
Hence, increased public utilization driven by increased routine budgets for public health 
clinics appears to have positive spillovers for the private sector. An increase in the share 
of development spending, on the other hand, is associated with a decrease in private care 
utilization, probably due to the specific nature of development spending. There seems to 
be no differential effect of development spending for public health care utilization. 
The increase in public sector utilization associated with additional public 
spending, and the absence of substitution effects, does not lead to increased household 
health expenditures. Rather, we find negative but statistically insignificant effect in the 
data. This would suggest that either increased local public health budgets have been 
partly used to reduce the direct costs of public care for patients through reduction of user 
                                                 
9 For detailed estimation results we refer again to the supplemental appendix. 
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fees, that the mix of services has changed through an increase in routine low-cost services, 
or that prices in the private sector have been cut in response to public sector investments. 
We next investigate the distributional effects of public health spending on 
utilization, by taking the utilization rate of different per capita expenditure quartiles as 
outcome variable in equation (5) 10 . The fixed effect results are given in Table 7. 
Additional district health spending increases health care utilization mainly for the poorest 
half of the population. A one percent increase in public spending increases the utilization 
rate by 0.014 vppm for the poorest quartile and 0.020 vppm for the second quartile. This 
mainly occurs at public centers, with no differential effect between routine and 
development spending. We find no effect of public spending on OOP health spending by 
households. The coefficients are negative, but not statistically significant. 
The marginal benefit incidence estimates can be directly calculated from the 
quartile specific demand elasticity relative to the demand elasticity of the entire 
population and the average utilization rates per quartile. The elasticities are given in 
Table 9, corresponding to the patterns found in Table 7. Elasticities are estimated 
following equation (5), with log(uit) as dependent variable. 
Demand for public outpatient care utilization is relatively inelastic with respect to 
public spending. A one percent increase in district health spending is associated with a 
statistically significant increase of 0.09 percent. This implies that the unit cost increases 
with increased public spending; that is, the average benefit of public outpatient care in 
terms of public resource increases, for example through increased quality of public care 
or reduced user fees. The demand elasticity is higher for the poorest quartiles, at 0.14, 
                                                 
10 Since we only use districts from the balanced panel for which survey data contains at least 50 observation 
per quartile, for the quartile analysis we lose 8 districts from the balanced panel, reducing it to 199 districts, 
with 796 observations from 2002-2005. 
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while the hypothesis of perfectly inelastic demand is not rejected for the two richest 
quartiles. We find no statistically significant estimates for private outpatient care or OOP. 
Table 10 presents the estimated marginal benefit incidence following (5). Because 
we are primarily interested in relative benefits across quartiles, we omit α for 
convenience, since this is a constant across quartiles. The distributional pattern in demand 
elasticities reveals a pro-poor marginal behavioural response (1 + θq – θ ), while the 
initial utilization share does not. The combined result suggests that the benefits from 
public spending are spread fairly equally across the population. The positive demand 
response of the poor to public spending results in a marginal benefit incidence that is 
more pro-poor than the average benefit incidence. Despite the pro-poor behavioural 
response, the initial utilization shares dominate the marginal benefits. 
 
4.3. Sensitivity analysis 
There seems to be little scope for endogeneity bias in the empirical results in the previous 
section. However, a potential source of bias could be due to spurious correlation between 
local public health budgets and utilization through omitted variables. Two variables raise 
particular concerns. The first is economic welfare of the district population, as this is 
likely to drive demand for health care as well as local revenue raising capacity. Our 
analysis of health spending patterns finds that district own revenues affect routine health 
spending, indicating scope for omitted variable bias through district variation in changes 
in economic welfare. A second possible omitted variable is the social safety net health 
card scheme, which was introduced during the economic crisis in 1998, and is managed 
centrally by the ministry of health. This health card was targeted to the poorest 
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households, entitling recipient to price subsidies at public health care facilities. Public 
health care providers were compensated through lump sum transfers. If the health card 
program crowds out local spending, this may cause an upward bias in the observed public 
spending effects, since the health cards are targeted towards poorer districts with 
relatively smaller health budgets and lower utilization rates. 
Information on both variables is available in Susenas. Per capita household 
consumption serves as indicator of economic welfare, and questions on health card 
receipt are included in the questionnaire for all years. However, both variables are 
potentially endogenous in the utilization regressions, while obvious instrumental 
variables are not at hand. Therefore, we opt for a sensitivity analysis, evaluating the 
robustness of the results to including these variables. If indeed there was an omitted 
variable bias, we would expect the health spending coefficients to be sensitive to 
specification. 
The estimated effects of health spending on utilization or OOP payments are 
robust to including per capita consumption in the specification, as shown in panel A of 
Table 8. All the estimates are well within one standard error. The coefficients for 
outpatient care are very similar. For OOP payments the coefficient becomes larger in 
absolute terms, but remains imprecise. Nevertheless, per capita consumption is strongly 
correlated with utilization of private outpatient care (but not with public) and OOP health 
payments. 
The results for the specification including health card coverage are given in panel 
B of Table 8, and show that the health spending coefficients are very similar to the 
specification without health card coverage. Health card coverage is associated with an 
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increase in utilization of public care. Interestingly, the increase in subsidized outpatient 
care goes together with an increase in OOP health spending. This is a similar effect to 
that found in China by Wagstaff and Lindelow (2008), who argue that increased 
insurance coverage encourages use of higher cost services due to lumpiness and 
indivisibility of health care. 
We stress however that this sensitivity test does not constitute a rigorous impact 
evaluation of the health card program, and some caution is warranted when interpreting 
the results because of possible selection bias introduced by non-random geographic 
targeting. The main point of this exercise is to show that our results are not sensitive to 
omitting health card coverage from the empirical specification. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyses spending patterns and utilization of health services during the first 
years of decentralization in Indonesia. We looked in particular at the relationship between 
local revenues and health spending categories (development and routine), and their effect 
on health care utilization. Indonesia’s partial decentralization brought a large proportion 
of the health budget under control of district authorities and induced a massive 
redistribution of resources across districts. 
Local government health spending increased sharply with decentralization, 
reflecting the transfer of responsibility and authority from the centre to the districts. In 
parallel, health care utilization increased from 2001 to 2004, in particular in the public 
sector. 
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Public health spending appears close to unit elastic (around 0.9) with respect to 
local revenues. District revenues do not seem completely fungible with respect to health 
spending, as the source of financing matters. Spending is mostly driven by DAU transfers, 
while inequalities in local revenues sources play an important role for routine health 
spending, suggesting divergence in spending due to differences in local endowments. 
Transfers from the central government (DAU and DAK) are important sources of 
financing for development spending, while we do not find that resource rich districts 
allocate more funds to development health spending. These results suggest that the 
central government retains a strong role in influencing local health budgeting and 
addressing horizontal inequalities in district public health spending. Tied transfers (DAK) 
seem particular effective for regulating development spending, as these do not appear to 
crowd out local health spending. 
Local public health spending seems to increase overall health care utilization, in 
particular for the poorest half of the population, without affecting OOP health payments 
or utilization of the private sector, once we control for confounding factors. This result 
provides no support for the hypothesis that public spending crowds out private spending 
in health. Increased routine spending seems to have positive effects on both public and 
private health care utilization. 
Translating our results to a marginal benefit incidence analysis, taking into 
account behavioural responses to changes in publics spending, suggests that increased 
public health spending improves targeting of public funds to the poor. At the margin, 
increased local public health spending leads to net public resource transfers from the 
richest to the poorest quarter of the population, as it increases both public health care 
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utilization by the poor and the average benefit of public funds through using these 
services. However, the initial utilization shares still dominate the marginal benefits, such 
that the bulk of the benefits accrue to the two middle quartiles. Hence, for effective 
targeting of public resources to the poor, increased public health spending induced 
through reallocation of central resources could be complemented with more directly 
targeted demand side interventions, for example price subsidies for the poor or social 
health insurance. 
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Table 2 Public spending on health by level of Government (Nominal, in billion Rupiah) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Central Government 3,119 2,907 5,752 5,595 
Provincial spending 1,745 2,372 2,821 3,000 
District Government 4,387 5,725 7,473 8,108 
Total public health spending 9,251 11,004 16,046 16,703 
Source: World Bank (2008). 
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics for balanced panel (district averages) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Per capita district revenues and spending      
Total revenues  415,987 508,375 557,883 563,934 
DAU revenues 316,289 369,773 377,826 371,202 
Shared tax revenue 31,218 39,180 44,927 50,786 
Shared non tax revenue 20,258 36,496 37,821 40,204 
DAK revenue 5,296 2,728 17,559 19,180 
Own revenues 27,429 38,724 41,112 41,767 
Revenues from other sources 15,497 21,472 38,637 40,795 
Total public spending on health 26,057 32,329 39,033 41,959 
Development spending on health 5,611 7,735 15,830 17,514 
Routine spending on health 20,446 24,594 23,203 24,445 
     
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Household utilization and spending on health     
Full population     
Outpatient utilization rate – public 0.0727 0.0874 0.0827 0.0944 
Outpatient utilization rate – private 0.0793 0.0786 0.0753 0.0724 
Per capita OOP health spending 8,368 6,526 6,664 7,242 
     
Poorest quartile     
Outpatient utilization rate – public 0.0736 0.0716 0.0892 0.0825 
Outpatient utilization rate – private 0.0530 0.0464 0.0476 0.0459 
Per capita OOP health spending 3,339 2,668 2,498 2,386 
N 207 207 207 207 
Note: District revenue, public spending and OOP health payments in 2001 constant prices Rupiah. 
Outpatient utilization rates reflect the average number of outpatient visits in the last month. OOP health 
spending reflects per capita household OOP health payments in the last month. 
Source: Revenue from fiscal data from ministry of finance, utilization and OOP spending from Susenas 
household survey. 
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Table 4 Elasticity of per capita district public health spending w.r.t per capita district 
revenue 
 Random effects Fixed effects Hausman test 
Routine spending 0.8431** 0.8284** 0.0022 
 [0.0465] [0.0657]  
Development health spending 1.2371** 1.1192** 0. 5717 
 [0.0723] [0.1376]  
Total health spending 0.9468** 0.8789** 0. 0133 
 [0.0344] [0.0449]  
Statistical significance: + at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at one percent level. 
Note: balanced panel of 207 districts, 828 observations, 2001-2004. All models control for demographic 
characteristics (average age, household size and percentage female population), percentage rural population, 
district splits, region fixed effects and aggregate time shocks. The Hausman test reports p-values for 
rejecting the hypothesis that the difference in coefficients is not systematic. See the supplemental appendix 
for detailed estimates. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Table 5 Elasticity of per capita district public health spending w.r.t per capita district 
revenue source (district fixed effects) 
 Routine Development Total 
Total district revenue 0.8653** 1.0534** 0.8810** 
 [0.0663] [0.1386] [0.0453] 
Revenue shares    
Own revenue 2.0303** 1.2494 1.4428** 
 [0.7373] [1.5422] [0.5037] 
Shared tax revenue 0.3574 -3.3658** -0.9871** 
 [0.5445] [1.1390] [0.3720] 
Shared non tax revenue -0.8711 -0.1989 -0.7042+ 
 [0.6053] [1.2662] [0.4135] 
DAK revenue -1.1145 3.0818* 0.1264 
 [0.7247] [1.5158] [0.4951] 
Revenue from other sources -0.5009 0.4164 -0.2940 
 [0.3551] [0.7427] [0.2426] 
District splits -0.0218 -0.0027 -0.0612* 
 [0.0416] [0.0871] [0.0284] 
Statistical significance: + at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at one percent level. 
Note: balanced panel of 207 districts, 828 observations, 2001-2004. All models control for demographic 
characteristics (average age, household size and percentage female population), percentage rural population, 
district splits, aggregate time shocks and district fixed effects. See the supplemental appendix for detailed 
estimates. Standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 6 Effect of (lagged) log per capita district public health spending on outpatient 
health care utilization rates and household out-of-pocket health spending (district fixed 
effects) 
 Public Private Total OOP 
A. Without source of health spending     
District health spending 0.0114** 0.0042 0.0156** -94.42 
 [0.0039] [0.0036] [0.0060] [459.56] 
B. With source of health spending     
District health spending 0.0111** 0.0059+ 0.0170** 1.40 
 [0.0039] [0.0036] [0.0060] [465.43] 
Share of development spending 0.0037 -0.0234** -0.0197 -1,269.52 
 [0.0084] [0.0076] [0.0129] [995.61] 
Statistical significance: + at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at one percent level. 
Note: balanced panel of 207 districts, 828 observations, 2002-2005. All models control for demographic 
characteristics (average age, household size and percentage female population), percentage rural population, 
district splits, aggregate time shocks and district fixed effects. A Hausman test rejects the random effects in 
favour of the fixed effects specification in all cases except for public utilization. See the supplemental 
appendix for detailed estimates. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Table 7 Effect of (lagged) log per capita district public health spending on outpatient 
health care utilization rates and household out-of-pocket health spending, by per capita 
expenditure quartile (district fixed effects) 
 Public Private Total OOP 
     
Quartile 1 (poorest) 0.0175** -0.0032 0.0143+ -65.80 
 [0.0065] [0.0039] [0.0083] [215.74] 
Quartile 2 0.0164** 0.0032 0.0197** 64.38 
 [0.0055] [0.0042] [0.0075] [270.08] 
Quartile 3 0.0063 0.0005 0.0068 -216.31 
 [0.0060] [0.0050] [0.0087] [543.65] 
Quartile 4 (richest) -0.0055 -0.0048 -0.0104 -1,685.68 
 [0.0085] [0.0090] [0.0149] [1,878.55] 
Statistical significance: + at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at one percent level. 
Note: balanced panel of 199 districts, 796 observations, 2002-2005. The number of districts differs from 
Table 6 as we only use districts from the balanced panel for which the survey data contains at least 50 
observations for each quartile. Model specification similar to Table 6. See the supplemental appendix for 
detailed estimates. Standard errors in brackets. 
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Table 8 Sensitivity analysis of the effect of (lagged) log per capita district public health 
spending on outpatient health care utilization rates and household out-of-pocket health 
spending (district fixed effects) 
 Public Private Total OOP 
A. Including log per capita 
household consumption 
    
District health spending 0.0116** 0.0022 0.0138* -478.65 
 [0.0039] [0.0035] [0.0060] [441.50] 
Per capita consumption -0.0065 0.0576** 0.0511* 11,473.37** 
 [0.0131] [0.0117] [0.0200] [1,475.03] 
B. Including district health 
card coverage 
    
District health spending 0.0110** 0.0040 0.0150* -117.07 
 [0.0039] [0.0035] [0.0059] [458.97] 
Health card coverage 0.0726** 0.0306 0.1032** 4,328.51+ 
 [0.0207] [0.0191] [0.0319] [2,469.73] 
Statistical significance: + at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent level. 
Note: balanced panel of 207 districts, 828 observations, 2002-2005. All models control for demographic 
characteristics (average age, household size and percentage female population), percentage rural population, 
district splits, aggregate time shocks and district fixed effects. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
Table 9 Elasticity of outpatient health care utilization and household out-of-pocket health 
spending with respect to district public health spending, by per capita expenditure quartile 
(district fixed effects estimates) 
 Public Private Total OOP 
Quartile 1 (poorest) 0.1441+ -0.0922 0.0446 -0.0738 
Quartile 2 0.1418* 0.0006 0.0838 0.0224 
Quartile 3 0.0821 -0.0028 0.0173 -0.0088 
Quartile 4 (richest) -0.0339 -0.0516 -0.0326 -0.0723 
Total 0.0897+ 0.0071 0.0583 -0.0173 
Statistical significance: + at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at one percent level. 
 
Table 10 Relative marginal benefit incidence of spending on outaptient services 
 1 + θq – θ dq,2002 dq (1 + θq – θ) 
Quartile 1 (poorest) 1.054 0.232 0.245 
Quartile 2 1.052 0.257 0.270 
Quartile 3 0.992 0.272 0.270 
Quartile 4 (richest) 0.876 0.243 0.213 
Note: results based on statistically significant estimates are reported in bold. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 Correlation between district log per capita health spending and log per capita 
revenues in 2001 and 2004  
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